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RECOVERY FOR PURELY MENTAL INJURIES
UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION: AVIATION-
Passengers brought action against an airline to recover
for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result
of an incident involving loss of power during flight. Arti-
cle 17 of the Warsaw Convention does not allow recovery
for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by physical
injury or physical manifestation of injury. Eastern Airlines,
Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1555 (1991).
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in the case of Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,' in order
to consider the allowance of recovery for purely mental
injuries under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.2 This
issue has long been debated in American courts but raises
an original question for the Supreme Court. The Court's
decision will provide uniformity among the circuit courts
in disallowing recovery for mental anguish, unaccompa-
nied by physical injury, resulting from international air
carrier accidents. Several issues concerning mental inju-
ries under the Warsaw Convention were not addressed by
the Court, and further refinement of these points will be
necessary in the future.
The cause of action arose when, due to a loss of oil
pressure, an Eastern Airlines jet began losing altitude rap-
idly, and the crew informed passengers that the plane
would be ditched in the Atlantic Ocean. After a period of
powerless descending flight, the crew managed to restart
496 U.S. 904 (1990).
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11, repinted in note following 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
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an engine and land the plane without further incident.
Subsequently, several passengers brought separate com-
plaints against Eastern solely for mental distress unac-
companied by physical injury.
The district court entertained the complaints in a con-
solidated proceeding, concluding that mental anguish
alone is not compensable under article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention. Article 17 sets forth conditions under which
an international air carrier can be held liable for injuries
to passengers.4 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the judgment of the district court and permitted recovery
for purely mental injuries. 5 The court examined the legal
meaning of lesion corporelle,6 a French phrase in the treaty,
the concurrent and subsequent history of the Warsaw
Convention, and cases interpreting article 17, and held
that the phrase lesion corporelle in the authentic French text
of article 17 encompasses purely mental injuries.7 On
that basis, the court granted recovery to the passengers.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the courts concerning mental
anguish awards under the Warsaw Convention. 9 The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals, holding that article 17 does not allow recovery for
purely mental injuries.' 0 In making its determination, the
Court looked beyond the written words of the treaty to its
history, negotiations, and practical construction adopted
by the parties to thoroughly analyze the intent of the sig-
s In re Eastern Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5,
1983, 629 F. Supp. 307, 309 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
4 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17.
5 Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
6 The term lesion corporelle has been translated to mean "bodily injury." See infra
note 37 and accompanying text.
7 Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d at 1471.
8 Id. at 1471-80.
9 Eastern Airlines, 496 U.S. at 904. The court noted that, while the Eleventh
Circuit held purely psychic trauma to be compensable under article 17 of the War-
saw Convention, the New York Court of Appeals held otherwise in Rosman v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974). Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd,
111 S. Ct. 1489, 1493 (1991).
10 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1502-03.
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natories."I The Court left for another day the issue of
whether passengers could recover for mental injuries ac-
companied by physical injuries.' 2  Further, the Court re-
fused to decide whether the Warsaw Convention provides
the exclusive cause of action for injuries incurred during
international flights, foreclosing independent state tort
claims for such injuries.' 3
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In many English-speaking countries and several other
nations, liability in international air transportation is gov-
erned by rules promulgated in the Warsaw Convention.' 4
The Warsaw Convention is an international treaty to
which the United States, though not a signatory, has ad-
hered since 1934 by Proclamation of the President.' 5 The
Warsaw Convention of 1929 was the result of efforts to
achieve an international agreement to both regulate and
also encourage the aviation industry in its formative
years. 16 With these long-range goals in mind, the Con-
vention's participants had two objectives. 17 First, they in-
tended to establish uniform rules governing parties to
international air carriage contracts.' 8 Second, the partici-
I' Id. at 1493.
12 Id. at 1502.
" Id.
'4 More than 120 nations are parties to the Warsaw Convention. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 247 (1984); see LEE
GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 285-93
(1988) (listing signatory parties to the Convention); I LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIA-
TION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01[3], at 11-7 to 11-8 (1990).
is 49 Stat. 3000, 3014 (1934). The Warsaw Convention was drafted at Warsaw,
Poland,.on October 12, 1929, and the United States later became a party to the
treaty with reservation by Proclamation of the President, dated October 29, 1934,
as recommended by the United States Senate. Executive G, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess.,
78 CONG. REC. 11, 577-82 (1934).
16 Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The
Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lesion Corporelle, 25 TEx. INT'L LJ. 127,
129 (1990).
'7 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967); 1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIA-
TION TORT LAW § 11:4, at 635-36 (1978).
10 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 17, at 635-36.
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pants intended to limit the liability of air carriers in
exchange for limiting the defenses available to such carri-
ers.' 9 Consequently, the two goals of uniformity and lim-
ited liability, which have facilitated recovery, have guided
judicial action regarding Warsaw Convention claims. °
The courts have balanced these factors in determining
which claims are permitted under the Convention.2
The United States' accession to the Warsaw Convention
in 1934 gave the Convention status as a treaty of the
United States, which constitutes the supreme law of the
United States.2 2 Therefore, it must be applied notwith-
standing state law. 3 Further, the Convention governs the
rights of all parties in any action for damages involving
international air transportation. 4 In 1966, the Warsaw
Convention's application in the United States was modi-
fied by the Montreal Agreement, a private agreement be-
tween the United States and international air carriers,
which raised the Convention's cap on liability in the
United States from a mere $8,300, as provided in the
Warsaw Convention of 1929, to $75,000 per passenger
and also eliminated the air carriers' due care defense.2
The Montreal Agreement resulted from the desire of air
carriers to placate the United States, who, because of in-
creasing dissatisfaction with the unrealistic liability limits
1o Id.
20 James M. Grippando, Warsaw Convention-FederalJurisdiction and Air Carrier Li-
ability for Mental Injuiy: A Matter of Limits, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 59, 68
(1985).
21 Id.; see Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1085, 1090 (2d Cir. 1977); Block v.
Compagnie Nationale Air, 386 F.2d 323, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1967).
22 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
23 See Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 737 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Warsaw Convention pre-
empted Texas law, therefore disallowing the award of attorney fees), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1186 (1985).
24 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
25 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302
(1966), reprinted in 19 STANLEY B. ROSENFIELD, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL AVIATION: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 49-50
(1984) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement]. The Montreal Agreement was ap-
proved by Civil Aeronautics Board Order No. E-28680.
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imposed by the treaty, threatened to pull out of the War-
saw Convention altogether.26
Currently in the United States, liability in international
air transportation is governed by the Warsaw Convention,
as modified by the Montreal Agreement.2 7 This agree-
ment provides that the carrier is absolutely liable for dam-
ages sustained in the event of the wounding or death of a
passenger or any other bodily injury incurred by a passen-
ger, unless the carrier can prove negligence on the part of
such passenger.28 This absolute liability applies if the ac-
cident causing the bodily damage took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the carrier's operations
of embarking or disembarking. 29
Immediately following accession by the United States to
the treaty, the courts did not view the Convention as
creating a cause of action.30  The courts first interpreted
the Convention as simply limiting monetary damages on
otherwise applicable law. 3 ' The view that the treaty cre-
ated only a presumption of liability, rather than an
independent cause of action,3 2 led to non-uniform treat-
ment of recovery against air carriers, thereby defeating
one of the primary objectives of the signatories, that of
26 See generally Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing the back-
ground of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent modification under the
Montreal Agreement); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974)
(discussing further the modification under the Montreal Agreement).
217 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 25.
28 Id. at 17.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258
n.2 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of
action, but merely establishes a presumption of liability if the otherwise applicable
substantive law provides a claim for relief based on the alleged injury), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 974 (1977); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 679 (2d
Cir. 1957) (stating that the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of action),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp.
1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reasoning that article 17 of the Warsaw Convention was
not an all-inclusive catalog of permissible domestic claims and thus did not pre-
clude claims for mental injury).
31 Husserl, 388 F. Supp. at 1252.
32 Id.
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uniformity.33
In the late 1970s, the courts began to construe the War-
saw Convention as the "universal source of a right of ac-
tion."31 4 In Benjamins v. British European Airways the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that courts must
interpret the Convention in a manner that promotes uni-
formity in such cases to the fullest extent.3 5 This decision
overruled prior United States case law that found no
cause of action to be created by the Convention.3 6
Since the courts have determined that the Convention
does indeed create a cause of action, the difficulty lies in
determining precisely which injuries are included within
its reach. According to the original French text, article 17
of the Convention provides for recovery by passengers for
any lesion corporelle, which has been translated to mean
"bodily injury. "' In the years immediately following the
drafting of the Convention, there was little inquiry into
the meaning of this phrase, because prior to the Montreal
Agreement, the amount of damages was so limited by the
Convention that the small amount available would be
used to compensate unquestioned damages, rather than
33 Sisk, supra note 16, at 149.
34 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); see generally Note, The Warsaw Convention Creates a
Cause of Action for Wrongful Death -Benjamins v. British European Airways, 38 MD. L.
REv. 120 (1978) (detailing the court's holding in Benjamins and interpreting the
result to signal a desire to return to uniformity in international air law). But see
Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that the Warsaw Convention does not preclude common law remedies for "acci-
dents" outside the meaning of article 17), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985).
35 Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 917-18. "[T]he overriding policy goal embodied in the
[Warsaw] Convention is the desire to formulate a uniform and universal set of
legal rules to govern international air transportation." In re Mexico City Aircrash
of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 411 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Benjamins, 572 F.2d at
917).
36 Russell J. Davis, Annotation, Warsaw Convention (49 Stat 3000 et seq.) as Creat-
inga Cause of Action, 51 A.L.R. Fed. 949, 951 (1981); see Mahaney v. Air France, 474
F. Supp. 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing Benjamins as authority for the proposi-
tion that the Warsaw Convention may establish a cause of action).
' Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17. The Supreme Court has character-
ized the English translation that was before the Senate upon the Convention's
ratification in 1934 as the "official American translation." Air France v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
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those damages for which recoverability was not yet cer-
tain. 8 Compensability of emotional distress, however,
became an issue in the 1970's as a result of a series of
terrorist hijackings leading to suits for mental anguish un-
accompanied by physical injury.3 9 More recently, passen-
gers have sought to recover for emotional distress
resulting from merely a "close call" during flight, from
which no bodily harm resulted.4 °
The question debated before the Supreme Court in
Eastern Airlines was whether article 17 encompasses a claim
for emotional distress that does not result from a "bodily
injury."' 4' Several courts have held article 17 to be appli-
cable only to actual physical injury.42 In support of this
view, commentators have urged that, "[r]ather than striv-
ing to impart a technical connotation to the term [lesion
corporelle], the ordinary meaning of the words should
prevail." 43
For example, in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,44 a case
arising from mental anguish caused by terrorists' hi-
jacking of an international flight, the New York Court of
Appeals, relying on the English translation of article 17,
held that the carrier was liable only for a passenger's "pal-
pable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by
38 Sisk, supra note 16, at 132.
39 See Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972); Husserl
v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see generally GEOR-
GETrE MILLER, LIABILIrY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 111-12 (1977) (analyz-
ing and criticizing American court decisions dealing with damages due to
hijacking); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Hiacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic
Trauma, 1 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & CoM. 345 (1973) (discussing recovery for psychic
injuries under the Warsaw Convention).
40 See Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d at 1462 (seeking recovery for mental anguish
resulting from warnings that the plane would be ditched in the ocean, although
the plane eventually landed safely, and no physical harm resulted).
4 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1493; see generally Comment, The Emotional Trauma
of Hiacking: Who Pays?, 74 Ky. L.J. 599, 611-20 (1985-86) (surveying conflicting
decisions as to whether article 17 encompasses claims for emotional distress unac-
companied by physical injury).
42 See Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974); Burnett v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
43 Sisk, supra note 16, at 129.
44 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974).
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the psychic trauma [of an accident], and for the damages
flowing from those bodily injuries, but not for the trauma
as such or for the nonbodily or behavioral manifestations
of that trauma."' 45 Likewise, in Burnett v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.,46 passengers brought suit for recovery of both
bodily injuries and mental anguish suffered as a result of a
hijacking of their airplane. The district court in New Mex-
ico held that recovery is permitted for mental trauma ac-
tually derived, from physical injuries.4 7  Since the
emotional distress occurs in conjunction with the physical
injury, the court considered such distress to be part of,
and not severable from, the bodily injury itself.48 Never-
theless, the court maintained that no recovery would be
permitted for mental injury alone.49
In contrast, other courts and commentators have held
the language of article 17 broadly covers any personal in-
jury, including emotional distress without accompanying
physical harm.5 0 For example, in Husserl v. Swiss Air Trans-
port Co., 5t the district court for the Southern District of
New York held that both mental and psychosomatic inju-
ries are "colorably within the ambit" of article 17.52 The
court stated that the drafters of the Convention indicated
no specific intent to include mental injuries. 3 At the
same time, both the general intent to make the treaty
comprehensive in its application and the desire to achieve
45 Id. at 857.
46 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
47 Id. at 1158.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1156-58.
-0 See, e.g., Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462, 1471, (lth Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991); Tarar v. Pakistan Int'l Airlines, 554 F. Supp. 471,
480 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 N.Y.S.2d 670,
673 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp.
1322, 1323-24 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp.
1238, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see generally RENE H. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY RE-
GIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER 146 (1981) (arguing that in French law,
the phrase lesion corporelle encompasses any "personal" injury whatsoever).
51 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
52 Id. at 1248-50.
-1 Id. at 1250.
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the goal of uniformity sufficed to encourage the court to
construe the Convention expansively in order to encom-
pass as many types of injuries, physical and mental, as are
reasonably within its reach. 54 Further, in Floyd v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc. ,5 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that the terms of the Warsaw Convention must
be construed broadly in order to advance its goal of uni-
formity.56 Therefore, the court held that passengers
could recover damages for mental injury, whether or not
accompanied by physical injury.57
III. CRITICAL CASE ANALYSIS
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Marshall, the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Eastern Airlines and held that
article 17 of the Warsaw Convention does not allow re-
covery for purely mental injuries. 58 In its analysis, the
Court looked beyond the written words of the treaty itself
to its history, negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties. 59 The Court examined each of
these factors in detail.
First, the Court examined the French legal meaning of
the phrase lesion corporelle, as used in the Warsaw Conven-
tion, to determine the expectations of all parties to the
Convention. 60  Bilingual dictionaries indicated that the
proper translation of the phrase is "bodily injury," sug-
gesting that article 17 does not permit recovery for purely
5 Id.
55 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
- Id. at 1480.
57 Id.
58 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1493.
59 Id.; see also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (holding that treaties
are construed more liberally than private agreements and, therefore, parties must
look beyond the written words to ascertain their meaning); Volkswagenwerk Ak-
tiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988) (stating that "[o]ther general
rules of construction may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous
passages").
o Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1494-1500.
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psychic injuries. 6 ' The Court's review of French legal
materials discovered that the phrase was rarely used in
French law.62 Justice Marshall noted that no French case
has construed article 17 to cover psychic injury and that
cases in which the phrase is used invariably involve physi-
cal injuries.63 The term lesion corporelle most frequently
was utilized in causes of action based on injuries incurred
in automobile accidents. 64
The Court then rejected the passengers' argument that
by 1929, France, unlike many other countries, permitted
tort recovery for mental distress.65 The Court reasoned
that such a general proposition of French tort law was not
indicative of the drafters' intent in this specific agree-
ment.66 The Supreme Court reiterated that its task was to
"give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent
with the shared expectations of the contracting parties. 6 7
Next, the Court turned to the negotiating history of the
Convention and found that the translation of lesion
corporelle as "bodily injury" is consistent with such his-
tory.68 From its review of the Convention's documentary
record, the Court found no evidence that the signatories
specifically considered liability for psychic injury.69 Jus-
tice Marshall avers that, because a remedy for mental
anguish was unknown to most jurisdictions in 1929, the
drafters would most likely have felt obliged to make ex-
61 Id. at 1494; seeJ.JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANCAJS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRAN-
CAIS DE TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES 205 (1953) (translating "bodily harm"
or "bodily injury" as lesion ou blessure corporelle); see also id. at 95 (translating the
term lesion as "injury, damage, prejudice or wrong"); id. at 41 (giving as one sense
of corporel the English word "bodily").
62 Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1495.
63 Id.
6 Id. The Court noted that in one case, the highest French court of ordinary
jurisdiction specifically distinguished intentional blows and injuries, characterized
as lisions, from neurotic disorders. Id.
65 Id. at 1495-96; see also Sisk, supra note 16, at 128 (arguing that a liberal inter-
pretation of article 17 would be consistent with the spirit of the Convention).
66 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1496.
67 Id. (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).
- Id. at 1497.
69 Id. at 1498.
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plicit reference to purely mental injury if they had specifi-
cally intended to provide for such recovery. ° The
Supreme Court further deemed the narrower reading of
lesion corporelle to be consistent with the primary purpose
of the parties negotiating at the Convention, namely the
limiting of liability of air carriers in an effort to encourage
growth of the then-nascent commercial aviation indus-
try.7' The Court emphasized that, regardless of what the
current view of the Warsaw Convention signatories may
be, in 1929 the negotiating parties were more concerned
with fostering a new industry than with fully compensat-
ing injured passengers.72 This legislative choice directed
the Court to interpret the phrase lesion corporelle narrowly,
thus excluding recovery for purely mental injury.73
The Supreme Court then examined the post-1929
"conduct" and "interpretations of the signatories," and
found that relevant evidence supports narrow translation
of lesion corporelle.7 4 First, in 1951, a committee composed
of twenty Warsaw Convention signatories convened in
Madrid and adopted a proposal to substitute the phrase
affection corporelle for lesion corporelle in article 17.75 The in-
tent of the French delegate who proposed the change of
language was to expand the coverage of the phrase to in-
clude injuries such as mental illness, due to fear that the
word lesion was too narrow and "presupposed a rupture in
the tissue."' 76 The United States delegate opposed the
change, desiring to exclude recovery for disturbances
neither connected with, nor occurring as the result of
bodily injury, but the committee nonetheless adopted the
70 Id. at 1498-99.
7' Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1499; see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 256 (1984); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at
497-99.
72 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1499.
73 Id.
74 Id. (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985)).
75 Id.; Minutes and Documents of the Eighth Session, Madrid, ICAO Legal Committee,
at xiii, 137, ICAO Doc. 7229-LC/133 (1951) [hereinafter ICAO].
76 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1499; see ICAO, supra note 75, at 136.
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proposal.7 7 Although the amendment was never imple-
mented, the Court found that the discussion and subse-
quent vote showed the view of the signatories that the
phrase lesion corporelle has a "distinctly physical scope."' 78
The court of appeals relied on three international
agreements, 79 each negotiated after the Warsaw Conven-
tion, in finding that the signatories' post-1929 conduct
supports a broad interpretation of lesion corporelle.80 The
Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' read-
ing of these agreements in each instance."' First, the
Hague Protocol of 1955 amended the Convention's re-
quirement of particular information to be included on
passengers' tickets, .using the phrase "personal injury" in
the English version, while the original French text contin-
ued to use the phrase lesion corporelle.8  Rather than find-
ing this to be a "subsequent interpretation of the
signatories" that "helps clarify the meaning" of lsion
corporelle, as did the court of appeals,83 the Supreme Court
concluded that without evidence of an intent to effect a
substantive change in, or clarification of that term, the
Court does not have discretion to infer such intent.84
Second, the court of appeals noted that under the Mon-
treal Agreement of 1966, which raised the limit of acci-
dent liability and eliminated due-care defenses, the notice
required on the back of passenger tickets included the
term "personal injury," rather than "bodily injury."8 5
The Supreme Court first asserted that the Montreal
Agreement is not a treaty, but rather is more contractual
in nature.86 It imposes merely a "quasi-legal and largely
17 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct., at 1499-1500; see ICAO, supra note 75, at 137.
78 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1500.
79 Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d at 1474-75.
so Id.
81 EasternAirlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1500.
82 Id.; International Conference on Private Air Law, The Hague, ICAO Doc. 7686-
LC/140, (Sept. 1955).
83 Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d at 1474-75.
84 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1500.
85 Id. at 1501; see Montreal Agreement, supra note 25, at 49-50.
" Eastern Airlines, I IIS. Ct. at 1501.
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experimental system of liability," and therefore does not
speak for the Warsaw Convention signatories.8 7 In addi-
tion, the Court noted that the Agreement does not claim
to change or clarify article 17, and so again, the Court did
not presume authority to make such an inference
independently. s8
Third, the court of appeals found that the Guatemala
City Protocol of 1971,89 which substituted the words "per-
sonal injury" for "wounding or other bodily injury" in ar-
ticle 17, supported a broader interpretation of lesion
corporelle.90 The Supreme Court countered that the parties
to the Protocol did not manifest such intent to expand the
phrase's meaning. 91 Since the United States Senate and
most other signatories to the Convention have not ratified
the Protocol, the Court did not consider it dispositive.
92
In its final analysis, the Supreme Court examined the
approaches of other signatory nations regarding the inter-
pretation of lision corporelle. The only judicial decision to
consider the matter was issued by the supreme court of
Israel, which held that article 17 does allow recovery for
purely psychic injuries. 93 The United States Supreme
Court explained that it was not persuaded by the reason-
ing of that decision.94 The Israeli court emphasized such
recovery as being a desirable policy goal, tracking the
evolution of Anglo-American and Israeli law to their pres-
ent allowance of recovery for mental injury in some cir-
cumstances. 95 Justice Marshall declared that, whether or
not these policy goals are desirable, the Court "cannot
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City, p. 183 ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/
167-2 (1972).
-o Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d at 1475.
9' Eastern Airlines, I llS. Ct. at 1501.
92 Id.
93 Cie Air France v. Teichner, 39 Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien at 243, 23
Eur. Tr. L. at 102 (arising from hijacking and detention, which allegedly caused
psychic injury to passengers).
94 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1502.
95 Teichner, 23 Eur. Tr. L. at 101-02.
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give effect to such policy without convincing evidence that
the signatories' intent with respect to Article 17 would al-
low such recovery.' '96
In concluding that air carriers cannot be held liable
under article 17 for an accident that has not caused a pas-
senger to suffer physical injury, physical manifestation of
injury, or death, the Court avoided two other issues. 97
First, the Supreme Court did not express a view as to
whether the Convention allows recovery for mental inju-
ries accompanied by physical injuries, as the passengers in
this case did not present this issue below.98 Second, this
case did not present the question of whether the Warsaw
Convention provides the exclusive cause of action for in-
juries incurred during international flight, and so the
Court refused to address the allowance of an independent
state tort action for mental injuries so incurred. 99
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The decision by the Supreme Court declares that the
Warsaw Convention's provisions will not be circumvented
by judicial decisions based on considerations of social pol-
icy.100 This holding, as well as other Supreme Court cases
in the past decade involving the Warsaw Convention, re-
flect the Court's long-standing determination that the
duty of the Court is to interpret a treaty and administer it
according to its terms.' 0' The historical context and plain
language of the Warsaw Convention reveal that its partici-
pants did not contemplate recovery for mental distress




1oo Stephen C. Johnson & Lawrence N. Minch, The Warsaw Convention Before the
Supreme Court: Preserving the Integrity of the System, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 93, 93-94
(1986).
10, Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853); see Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Mahfoud, 474 U.S. 213 (1985) (equally divided court), affg per curiam, Mahfoud v.
Eastern Airlines, 729 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'gper curiam, 17 Avi. Cas. (CCH)
17,714 (W.D. La. 1983); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
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unaccompanied by physical injury.' 0 2 As a result, the
Court will uphold exclusion of such recovery until the
Convention's signatories make clear their intent to alter
this recovery scheme.
Although the Supreme Court's mandate clearly reflects
that recovery for purely mental injury is not permitted
under the Warsaw Convention, the Court does not re-
solve whether such injury can form the basis of an in-
dependent state law claim. Under article VI of the United
States Constitution, the Warsaw Convention as a treaty is
part of the supreme law of the land, and as federal law,
may preempt state law by express or implicit terms.
0 3
Further, even if the treaty does not specifically displace
state regulation, preemption occurs where state law actu-
ally conflicts with federal law'0 4 or "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. '' 0°5
Regarding preemption, article 24 of the Convention in-
cludes an express provision that, in cases "covered by"
the Convention's liability provisions, "any action for dam-
ages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limits set out in this convention."'
0 6
Courts must now address whether the case of recovery for
purely mental injury is "covered by" the Convention's
provisions for liability. 0 7 Then, if covered, courts must
determine whether the "conditions and limits" to which
the case is subject are incompatible with an action under
state law. 108
102 Sisk, supra note 16, at 161.
Io3 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
104 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961); Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech,
311 U.S. 150, 162 (1940); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931); Nielsen
v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
105 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
-06 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 24 (emphasis added); Johnson &
Minch, supra note 100, at 110.
107 Johnson & Minch, supra note 100, at 110-11.
108 Id. at 111.
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In an effort to answer these questions, examination of
the first sentence of article 1 of the Convention sheds
light on the drafters' intent to create a broad provision to
regulate international air transportation: "This conven-
tion shall apply to all international transportation of per-
sons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for
hire."' 0 9 The breadth of coverage indicated by this open-
ing sentence is in accord with the objective of achieving a
uniform system of liability. Any finding that the Conven-
tion does not preempt state law would defeat the purpose
of the signatories to create this international uniformity in
air transportation."10 State laws are simply not in agree-
ment regarding liability for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress.' In fact, many jurisdictions of the
United States do not recognize a cause of action at all for
negligent infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied
by physical harm. 1 2 Due to the importance that the
Supreme Court placed on uniformity in Eastern Airlines v.
Floyd, 3 it is likely that the Court would find that the
treaty preempts state law if this issue were presented. An
independent state tort action for solely mental injuries
would most likely not be permitted, as the Convention
would provide the exclusive cause of action for injuries
sustained during international air transportation."' The
disallowance of an independent action seems to be the
logical and appropriate result of the United States' efforts
toward uniformity in the field of air transportation.
Also unaddressed by the Supreme Court is the question
of whether a passenger who suffers mental injuries accom-
panied by physical injuries can recover for the former,
due to the presence of the latter.' ' 5 As discussed above,
to Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
Johnson & Minch, supra note 100, at 116.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at
359-60 (5th ed. 1984).
112 Id. at 361.
113 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1502 (1991).
14 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, § 1.
15 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1502 (stating "we express no view as to whether
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in Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 116 the district court
allowed recovery for mental anguish that directly resulted
from physical injuries sustained by the passenger, but not
for mental anguish that occurred without accompanying
physical harm." 7 If the mental injury is seen as directly
caused by, and not severable from, the physical injury in-
curred, it is likely that the Court would follow the result in
Burnett, allowing the passenger recovery for the mental in-
jury. Since the Convention explicitly provides for recov-
ery for the physical injury," 8 it seems logical that any
further injury, even if mental, caused to the passenger by
such physical damage should be included as recoverable.
This result would probably expand only minimally the lia-
bility of the air carriers, and would not directly contravene
the intent of the signatories to the Convention.' 9 The
Supreme Court, however, has not yet been presented with
this issue, so the outcome is undetermined.
In short, in interpreting the Warsaw Convention the
Supreme Court has disallowed recovery for purely emo-
tional injuries suffered by airline passengers. At the same
time, although the question has not yet been addressed by
the Court, it appears likely that such injuries would be
compensable if accompanied by physical injury. Further,
it is likely that the Court would consider any independent
action for purely emotional injury to be preempted by the
Warsaw Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Supreme Court's holding in Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd indicates that, in interpreting the War-
saw Convention and its application to certain types of
damage in international air transportation, the Court will
passengers can recover for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical
injuries").
116 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
"7 Id. at 1156-58.
118 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17.
"9 See Burnett, 368 F. Supp. at 1158 (finding the delegates intended this type of
injury to be compensable).
1993] 1221
1222 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
not expand the effect of the treaty beyond that intended
by its participants. Any such expansion is within the au-
thority of the executive and legislative branches of the
United States government. The role of the judicial
branch is to simply interpret that which the other
branches have created as law. Further, the Court's em-
phasis on preserving the goal of uniformity, an objective
frequently mentioned by the signatories, indicates that
the Court may tend toward interpreting the Convention
as the exclusive cause of action for damages arising out of
international flight, should the issue one day be granted
review. Until that day, though, the Court confirms only
that the award of damages for purely mental injuries is
not permitted under the Warsaw Convention as written
today. 2 0
Sheila Wallace Holmes
120 Eastern Airlines, 111 S. Ct. at 1502.
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